




 GENDER, BOARD, AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
57181528-7  WANG XIAO 
SEMINAR ON RISK MANAGEMENT 
C.E. PROF. CHEUNG MING YAN WILLIAM 




Gender, as one of the most important social characteristics, has been studied extensively in social 
science. Literature in finance and economics evidence that diversity of gender in company boards 
matters for firm-level decisions. While empirical studies have been concentrated on the impact of 
gender diversity on firm-level financial outcomes, relatively few recent researches investigate the 
linkage between gender diversity of a company board and its degree of environmental risk-taking 
behavior. Pending on the increasing awareness of firms’ environmental responsibility, this paper 
investigates the relationship between board gender diversity and environmental risk-taking behavior 
using recent data available from the United States.  
 
We examine firms listed in U.S. stock exchanges from 2002 to 2019 with environmental risk data 
recently made available by Hassan et al (2019), company board information from the Execucomp 




from previous papers which often employ environmental disclosure score as a proxy of 
environmental uncertainty faced by an individual U.S. firm, this paper uses the environmental risk 
measure from Hassan et al (2019) instead. It is a new measure of environmental risk: the share of 
firms’ quarterly earnings conference calls that speakers devote to environmental risks caused by 
policy change.  
 
To test the relationship while mitigating endogeneity issues, we follow Huang and Kisgen (2013) to 
use the gender equality index developed by Sugarman et al (1988) as an instrumental variable (IV) 
of female board representation. Results from the IV analysis suggests that female board member 
representation significantly reduces firm-level environmental risk-taking behavior. Our result 
indicates when the female board representation increases by one standard deviation, the firm-level 
environmental risk exposure can be reduced by 1.5%. 
Overall our paper suggests that female board members bring environmental awareness into the 
boardroom, and more importantly, into action. Our results are robust to internal validity tests of a 
2SLS model and additional tests using overall political risk. As an additional test, we examine the 
determinants of female board representation such as paid maternity leave policy. Our difference-in-
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Section 1: Introduction 
 
With the growth of gender equality in the last decade, the ratio of the female board serving U.S. 
firms has increased from 2.3% in 2002 to 5.2% in 2018. Although the ratio has doubled in the past 
decades, still, there is room for improvement. As one of the most important social characteristics, 
gender has been examined extensively, in finance and economics literature, especially on whether 
and how gender diversity in the board impacts firm-level outcomes. Empirical results suggest that 
firm performance maybe associated with female board representation. For example, firms with better 
gender diversity are more likely to have a higher return on assets (Erhardt, Werbel & Shrader,2003) 
and higher Tobin’s Q (Carter et al. ,2003; Erhardt et al.,2003; Gordini & Rancati, 2017; Campbell & 
Mínguez-Vera, 2008). Coherently, past studies also point out that gender diversity is correlated with 
specific performance-enhancing policies such as greater innovation success on generating more 
patents and citations  (Chen, Leung & Evans, 2018), higher ESG ratings (Velte, 2016), less frequent 





Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, no recent research has investigated whether gender 
diversity of a board is related to the degree of environmental risk-taking behavior. Environment, as 
firms’ important stakeholders, can be directly affected by the firm’s manufacturing activities. On the 
other hand, environmental risk-taking behavior can cause destructive value losses of shareholders 
due to the pressure of tightening environmental policy and proactive ESG investments. Pending on 
the increasing awareness of firms’ environmental responsibility, this paper is aiming to investigate 
the relationship between board gender diversity and environmental risk-taking behavior in a U.S. 
setting.  
 
In light of gender socialization theory, diversity theory, and the behavioral difference between 
genders, we posit that female board members may have a significant mitigating impact on firm 
environmental risk level. The gender socialization theory suggests that women and men have 
different ethical views due to early experiences through social interactions. Specifically, women tend 
to have higher ethical sensitivity than men (Simga-Mugan et al , 2005). Hence female boards could 
be more motivated to mitigate environmental risk, which may hurt the value of the whole society. 
Furthermore, Diversity theory suggests that decision-makers with different backgrounds and 
perspectives can enhance the board decision-making process (Siliciano, 1996; Erhardt et al., 2003; 
Estélyi and Nisar, 2016). Female board members can bring different perspectives on balancing firm 
performance and environmental risks, hence increasing the possibility that the board finds optimal 
environmental policies. Finally, drawing on behavioral economics studies, females are found to be 
consistently more risk-averse and less overconfident than males in investment settings and 
professional settings (Byrnes et al., 1999; Olsen and Cox, 2001; Gibson et al., 2013). Those features 
also lend support to the hypothesis that firms with more female boards tend to preempt 





In order to test the hypothesis, U.S. listed firms from 2002 to 2019 are examined by collecting 
environmental risk data from Hassan et al (2019), board information from the Execucomp database, 
and financial information from COMPUSTAT database in WRDS. Typically, the environmental risk 
dataset from Hassan et al (2019) is constructed by computational linguistic interpretation of firms’ 
quarterly earnings conference call recordings. The variable environmental risk is based on the ratio 
that speakers devote to risks triggered by possible future environmental policy changes. We posit 
that this environment risk measurement could be an alternative to the more traditional environmental 
disclosure score provided by major vendors such as Bloomberg or Thompson Reuters. These 
environment scores are susceptible to different valuation criteria and have significant heterogeneity 
in statistical distribution (Dorfleitner et al., 2015). Most importantly, environmental scores produced 
by vendors are not strongly associated with to predict future environmental developments (Chatterji 
et al., 2009). In contrast, Hassan et al (2019) dataset may provides a better alternative measurement 
by retrieving information directly from firms. We further discuss the Hassan et al (2019) measures in 
a subsequent section.  
 
One of the most significant issues in investigating the relationship is endogeneity. To mitigate 
endogeneity biases including omitted variable and reverse causality, we follow Huang and Kisgen 
(2013) to use the gender equality index developed by Sugarman et al (1988) as an instrumental 
variable (IV) of female board percentage. We conjecture that state with higher gender equality index 
should be more attractive to female corporate executives. Yet the gender equality index should not 
be directly affected by a firms’ future environmental risk agenda, thus satisfied the exclusion 
restriction of an IV. Results from the IV analysis suggests that female board member percentage 
reduces firm-level environmental risk-taking behavior – but not the other way around. Our result 
indicates when the female board representation increases by one standard deviation, the firm-level 
environmental risk reduces by 1.5% over its mean.  Overall our paper suggests that female board 
members bring environmental awareness into the boardroom, and more importantly, into action. The 




political risks. As an additional test, we examine the determinants of female board representation 
such as  paid maternity leave policy. By a difference-in-difference analysis, we find weak evidence 
that maternity leave can increase female board representation. 
 
This paper contributes to existing literature, mainly in two ways. Firstly, to our knowledge, this 
paper is one of the few studies to link female board representation to environmental risk-taking 
behavior. Prior studies have focused on finding the impact on either the financial performance or 
overall ESG ratings (Erhardt, Werbel & Shrader,2003; Carter et al. ,2003; Erhardt et al.,2003; 
Gordini & Rancati, 2017; Velte, 2016). However, this study specifies the target of environmental 
risk-taking behavior and finds that a negative relationship does exist. Secondly, given the 
background that investors, corporate decision-makers, and policymakers are raising awareness of 
firms’ environmental conduct, this paper provides evidence that female board representation can be 
a strong signal of firms’ superior environmental policies. 
 
Section 2:  Literature Review 
2.1 Gender diversity and firm performance 
With the growing attention to board diversity in recent years, the number of literature continues to 
grow. Whether gender diversity indeed improves firm performance, the empirical evidence remains 
mixed. Several previous studies have documented that board gender is one of the critical 
determinants of firm outcome (e.g., Huang and Kisgen, 2013; Cumming et al.,2015; Levi and Li, 
2014).  
 
The majority of past literature has examined the impact of gender diversity in the boardroom on its 
financial outcomes. For example, Erhardt, Werbel & Shrader (2003) use return on asset and 
investment as proxies, indicate that they are positively associated with board gender diversity. Carter 




higher firm outcomes amongst firms from Fortune 1000. A similar result is observed when reducing 
the sample to only U.S. large-sized firms (Erhardt et al.,2003) 
 
Although current empirical outcomes remain heavily concentrated in the U.S., there is also similar 
evidence from worldwide. Campbell & Mínguez-Vera (2008) find that diversity rises firm values 
when using Spain panel data. In Italy, when board diversity measured by Blau& Shannon indices, 
there is also evidence that it is positively correlated to Tobin’s Q (Gordini & Rancati, 2017)  
 
Different from Europe, Asia countries are conspicuous due to the lack of government intervention on 
female board quota. Roberts & Whiting (2015) conducted a comprehensive study of board diversity 
in East Asia by using data from Hong Kong, South Korea, Malaysia and Singapore. Using return on 
Equity as performance proxy, authors documented that increasing numbers of female board 
enhances firm performance. Interestingly, the study also suggests that the magnitude of this 
enhancement decreases in the country with a more open and supportive culture for female 
employment. 
 
In contrast to the above-listed studies, several literature shows that this relationship exists in a non-
linear manner or conditionally exists. Adams et al (2009) state that this link is valid only when the 
firm is with weaker corporate governance. Moreover, there is evidence that the firm performance is 
not linearly improved with the increase of the female board presence. The non-linearity of this 
positive relationship is theoretically backed by the critical mass theory developed by Kanter(1997). 
The skewed group, which defined by Kanter (1997), is a group in which existence of a certain 
dominant type (for example, male members) controls the culture and norms within the group. In this 
case, female members are defined as in a “token” status and the strategies of females to cope with 
this status is to hide personal characteristics behind gender stereotypes (Kanter, 1997). When 
increase the relative number of members to a balanced situation, Kanter (1997) finds that females 




corporate board setting, the mass critical theory suggests that when below the critical mass threshold, 
female board does not contribute to performance by utilizing their different expertise, but when 
exceed certain threshold, the balanced group outperforms skewed group by its expanded expertise 
pool.  
 
In the meantime, the theory is empirically tested by Joecks, Pull& Vetter (2013). The paper shows 
that gender diversity at first negatively impacts performance, only after a critical threshold of 30% 
presence, the association starts to appear. Similarly, Liu et al. (2014) find that among China’s listed 
firms from 1999 to 2011, the positive impact is more substantial in firms with above three female 
board members than those with less than three female boards. 
 
Despite the financial performance, studies on non-financial metrics such as sustainability are gaining 
attention in recent years. Although no paper directly studies the relationship between environmental 
risk and gender diversity, some of past literatures use ESG (Environment, Social, Governance) score 
as their proxy. Few prior studies have documented that higher female representation in the 
boardroom is associated with better ESG ratings. Velte (2016) finds a positive relationship between 
female board members and higher ESG performance in an example of German and Austrian-listed 
firms. On the other hand, the critical mass theory is also confirmed in this topic because the relation 
is insignificant when the number of female boards is below three (Manita et al.,2018). Environment 
disclosure score as one of the independent compositions of the overall ESG score measures the 
possible future environmental impact of an investment in a company (Kell, 2014). To avoid the 
opacity of the ESG data and minimize the reliance on the company’s voluntary disclosure, a major 
database such as Bloomberg or MSCI collect the ESG related data through traditional open sources 
utilizing artificial intelligence. This fact-based characteristic of the data leads to limited 
predictability of firms’ future environmental risks. In order to better understand the future 




environmental risk developed by Hassan et al (2019) are employed in this paper instead of the E 
score. 
 
2.2 Board, Environmental Risk and Firm Performance  
 
The boardroom plays a significant role in producing a firm’s environmental policies and initiatives 
that makes direct impacts on the environment. The literature on the firm’s environmental 
performance and corporate governance is increasing at a rapid pace. However, mixed empirical 
results have been produced on the relationship between firm-level environmental outcomes and 
board characteristics. It is shown that board size and independence significantly affect CSR 
environmental ratings (Walls et al., 2012). Kassinis et al (2003) focused on linking environmental 
litigation with corporate governance and stakeholder theories. The likelihood of becoming a 
defendant in a lawsuit increases with the size of the board; the proportion of directors in 
manufacturing companies and the proportion of internal ownership decreases with the number of 
independent directors. However, McKendall (1999) argues that they find no evidence suggesting 
that board independence, joint Chair-CEO, attorneys on boards, and the existence of social 
responsibility committees are related to less environmental violations. But Instead, among serval 
dimensions of corporate board structure, their results indicate that the market value of stocks held by 
corporate officers is positively related to less environmental lawsuits. 
 
Similar to the argument around the board structure and environmental performance, debates persist 
over the question that does environmental performance ultimately affects firms’ financial outcomes. 
First of all, the stakeholder theory (Freeman,1984) suggests that society and the environment as one 
of the stakeholders of corporate, appropriately managed environment relationships enhance the firm 
value (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). From a different angle, some argue that companies’ private 
cost for clean-ups and environmental initiatives pushes price up hence reduce competitiveness. 
However, porter (1995) points out that the above argument is based on the assumption that 




operate in a real-world competitive environment are continually looking for innovative solutions to 
cope with all those pressures. Consequently, he indicates that adequately designed environmental 
code can trigger innovation hence allow companies to produce in more efficient ways. 
Complementary to the above theoretical perspectives, several empirical evidence suggests that 
superior environmental performance is positively related to better financial performance (Konar and 
Cohen, 2001;  
Clarkson et al , 2011; Eccles et al , 2014; Miroshnychenko et al , 2017). 
Konar(2001) measures the magnitude of deterioration on asset value caused by environmental 
misconduct. The authors find that A 10 percent reduction in hazardous chemical emissions results in 
a market value gain of $34 million. Clarkson(2011) also finds the same relationships in the most 
polluting industries, and firms’ investment in improving environmental performance can 
immediately be realized on financial performance in the subsequent year. On the other hand, some 
works argue that pursuing environment-related activities conditionally destroy firm value. Elsayed 
(2004) argues that the relationship between environmental and financial performance exists in a non-
linear manner, consistent with the theory suggests that firms start to benefit from invest in 
environment initiatives until the marginal cost becomes equal to its marginal benefit. Pushing this 
finding forward, Misani and Pogutz (2015) find that firms achieve the highest financial performance 
when their carbon emission performance is neither extreme low or high, but intermediate. 
Moreover, past literature also documents a list of factors that affect the extent of benefit from  
improved environmental performance. Iwata and Okada (2011) documented that the benefit to 
financial outcomes varies across different initiatives. For example, reducing waste emissions 
improves all financial metrics, whereas less carbon omission typically boosts return on asset. 
Industry-wise, there is also evidence shows that the positive effect is more significant in comparably 
“dirty” and non-proactive industries than relatively “clean” and proactive industries (Qi et al, 2014; 
Lucas and Noordewier, 2016). Furthermore, conditions of macroeconomics also play an important 
role in the relation. Muhammad et al (2015) reports that when using the 2008 Global Financial Crisis 




disappeared when in the middle of the crisis (2008 to 2010). Besides, as a proxy of market 
conditions, switching costs, and competitive intensity have a joint negative moderating effect on the 
relationship (Feng et al , 2016).  
 
Although the debate continues, it is worth noting that better financial performance is not the only 
motivation to nudge firms to be greener. Undeniably, corporate environmental policies have become 
an issue of growing importance for board members, due to increasing pressure exerted by external 
stakeholders such as investors and consumers.  
 
 
2.3 Behavioral difference, Gender socialization, and Diversity theory 
Although there are no past studies investigate the link between firm-level environmental risk and 
gender diversity in the board room, a number of theories and empirical results lead us to conjecture 
that females are expected to make better ethical decisions on environmental problems to reduce the 
possible risk. These perspectives include gender difference on risk aversion; gender socialization 
theory and diversity theory 
Behavioral difference between genders has been examined widely in previous literature in finance, 
economics, and psychology. Empirical findings generally have the consensus that, on average, 
females arere less risk-tolerant than men (Byrnes et al., 1999; Olsen and Cox, 2001; Gibson et al., 
2013). Byrnes et al. (1999) investigate through a meta-analysis of 150 studies, reports that men are 
more likely to participate in gambling than women. Similarly, in Cupples et al. (2013), the authors 
find that educational background serves as a mediator to reduce the gender gap in risk-taking 
behavior. Extend the scope to financial activities, the gender difference in risk tolerance is still 
robust. When analyzing the composition of individual financial portfolios, women are more likely to 
hold deposit certificates and are less likely to hold more volatile assets such as stocks (Xiao,1995). 
The same evidence is shown among mutual fund investors: female investors tend to take fewer risks 




settings, Huang and Kisgen(2013) indicate that firms with female CEOs and CFOs are less likely to 
issue debts and less frequently engage with acquisition activities. Faccio et al (2013) show that 
companies lead by female CEO tend to make safer financing or investment decisions. Similarly, 
firms with female executives are more cautious in financial reporting (Barua et al.,2010). 
 
Despite the risk preference, females also tend to demonstrate behavioral differences in terms of 
overconfidence and openness to expert advice. Huang and Kisgen (2013) measure the level of 
overconfidence through the personal transaction of stock options and stock purchasing behavior, find 
that male directors are significantly more overconfident than their female colleagues.  At the same 
time, they argue that this high level of overconfidence finally transforms into engaging more 
acquisition activities and debt issuance. Not only financial performance can be affected by 
overconfidence, but the prior study also documents that executive hubris can be negatively 
correlated to socially responsible activities and positively connected with irresponsible misconducts 
(Tang et al., 2015). Base on those past empirical findings, it is natural to posit that firms with more 
gender diversified boards are less likely to underestimate environmental risks raised from production 
processes. When encountering such environmental uncertainty, opinions and suggestions from a 
third-party expert are crucial for managerial decisions. In spite of the fact that there is no direct 
evidence suggests that the female board tends to seek help specifically in terms of environmental 
issues, Levi (2015) reports that in the context of corporate takeovers, boards with more females are 
more presumably to consult with top financial firms. 
 
On the other hand, according to the gender socialization theory developed by Gilligan(1982), women 
and men have different ethical views as a result of early experiences through social interactions. 
Confirming with this theory, Simga-Mugan et al.(2005) examined the ethical sensitivity of managers 
using samples from U.S. and Turkey, finds that among ethical duties to three different parties: 
principals(clients and owners), agents(employees) and third parties(society), women managers 




context, Adams and Funk (2012) state that male directors are more concerned with personal success 
and influence than female directors, and with universalism and benevolence less so. These findings 
are consistent with Schwartz and Rubel (2005), whose study has found that men generally attach 
more priority to values of self-improvement across societies and cultures, while women prioritize 
values of self-transcendence. Coherently, higher gender diversity among board members is 
correlated with more corporate charity and more social-friendly initiatives (Jia and Zhang, 2013; 
Bear et al., 2010; Post et al., 2011). 
 
Furthermore, diversity theory suggests that decision-makers with different backgrounds and 
perspectives can enhance the board decision-making process. Backed up by empirical results 
(Siliciano, 1996; Erhardt et al., 2003; Estélyi and Nisar, 2016), scholars argued that this 
enhancement effect is delivered through mainly three mechanisms: first, full talent pool brings a 
higher level of creativity and innovation; second, heterogeneous groups can result in a wider range 
of ideas, increase possibility to find the optimal solution; third, level of trust can be reduced by 
gender diversity, improving monitoring quality.  
 
Based on the above-listed literature and their main findings, we hypothesize that firms with a higher 
proportion of female directors associate with lower environmental risk levels, ceteris paribus.  
 
The remainder of this paper is structure as follows. First, data construction and research design will 
be presented in Section two, followed by Sections three, which present and discuss the empirical 
findings. Section four provides robustness checks as well as additional tests on maternity leave 
policy. Finally, the overall findings will be discussed and concluded in Section five. 
 





3.1 Measuring female board percentage 
 
As the dependent variable, the female board representation is measured as the ratio of female board 
members. The variable female board percentage is calculated as the number of female directors 
divided by the scale of board size. This measure has been frequently utilized in the existing 
boardroom gender diversity literature (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Abbott et al.,2012; Chapple et 
al.,2012). Female representation is also frequently measured in a formation of a dummy variable of 
whether the board has at least one female board or not. However, such measurement may be limited 
on providing further useful information beyond the mere presence of the female board. Pursuant to 
the critical mass theory (Kanter,1997; Post, 2011; Manita et al., 2018) which states that female board 
presentation starts to influence firm performance beyond a certain threshold, the proportional 
measurement is arguably more potent in terms of investigating whether more female sitting the 
board is related to more significant impact. The variable of female board percentage, femaleboard%, 
is constructed using the data from the Execucomp within WRDS from 2002 to 2019. Although the 
database is not directly providing the two elements: number of female board and board size, the 
absolute number of the female are manually constructed by conditionally counting number of unique 
female board member records appeared in each firm each year. Similarly, board size is produced by 
counting unique records of board members that appeared in each firm each year.  
 
3.2 Measuring environmental risk 
 
With rising awareness of firms’ social responsibility and popularity of ESG investment among 
mutual funds and indices, several environmental risk indices are created to quantify firms’ 
environmental impacts. However, because the environmental issue is such a board topic, those 
indices, as a consequence, are primarily covering different aspects and very dependent on the 
context. Dorfleitner et al. (2015) suggest a noticeable lack of convergence in ESG measurement 




Reuters, KLD, and Bloomberg. Statistically, none of ratings from those three databases found to 
coincide in distribution. To mitigate possible issues that arise from the choice of data, the 
environmental risk dataset employed in this paper is directly obtained from the previous study which 
utilize computational linguistics interpretation to construct a new measurement of environmental 
policy-related risk (Hassan et al , 2019). We discuss the measure of Hassan et al (2019) below. 
 
The main idea of this new measurement is based on the share of firms’ quarterly earnings conference 
call that speakers devote to risks triggered by possible future changes on environmental policy. 
Thomson Reuters’ StreetEvents provides transcripts of 178,173 conference calls held in the purpose 
of earnings releases from 2002 to 2019. The total sample contains 7357 U.S. listed firms. Typically, 
the earning calls happen quarterly, generate approximately four observations for each firm-year. 
Without specifically breaking the processes in the conference call, the transcript of the whole 
conference call is interpreted. 
The processes of constructing the environmental policy-related risk mainly contain two steps. The 
development of the variable first begins with a simple objective defining the overall political risk by 
identifying the share of conversation between speakers and participants of the conference call that 
centers on uncertainties related to political issues. Hassan et al (2019) employed a pattern-based 
sequence classification method developed in computational linguistics to distinguish target 
conversation. The identification criteria mainly contain two perspectives: the conversation is 
identified as political-related either they are political in nature (for example, using the undergraduate 
level political textbook as a library), or identified as specifically related to certain political subjects 
such as health care speech by President Obama. The identified contents will be further classified as a 
political risk if the conversations contain the use of “risk” or “uncertainty” or their synonyms. The 
library ℙ for identification is firstly trained by the archetypical of discussion of politics, as well as 
the library ℕ trained for recognition of non-political talks. Each library contains a list of adjacent 
bigrams (i.e., two-word combinations) after omitting the punctuations. As the subject of linguistic 




b=1, …, 𝐵𝑖𝑡. Typically, one discussion is counted as related to political risk if a given political topic 
appears within ten words surrounding the word “risk,” “uncertainty,” or their synonyms. The 
descriptive equation (1) of the approach is the exact equation from the Hassan et al (2019) to 




𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 =  









Numerator start with the indicator function 1[•] to define the membership, ℙ ∖ ℕ  is the set of 
bigrams that belongs to ℙ but not ℕ. Variable r defines the position of risk-related bigrams. Hence 
the first two terms 𝟏[𝑏 ∈  ℙ ∖ ℕ] ×  𝟏[|𝑏 − 𝑟| < 10] essentially counts the number of bigrams that 
relates to political matters that happened in proximity to risk or uncertainty synonym within range of 
ten words. The third term 
𝑓𝑏,ℙ
𝐵ℙ
 plays the role of reflecting how strong does the bigram b is related to 
political matters. The 𝑓𝑏,ℙ defines the frequency of the bigram appears in the political library ℙ, and 
𝐵ℙ is the total counts of bigrams that exist in the political library. Hence, the whole numerator 
produces the frequency weighted sum of bigrams that is associated with politics in conjunction with 
risk-related terms. Then the whole term further divided by 𝐵𝑖𝑡, the total counts of bigrams in the 
conference i at time t. Finally, instead of a straight sum of bigrams, the 𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡  is a weighted 
variable adjusted for the relevance of texts to political topics  
In the next step of measuring political risks specifically relate to environmental topics, a set of 




environmental matters, while ℙ𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 is contains archetypical discussion on the topics that can be 
frequently related to politics such as healthcare, securities, etc. Consistent with equation (1), 
equation (2) starts with counting the appearance of bigrams that belongs to environmental political 
topic ℙ𝐸 but not contained in the non-political library ℕ, jointly with the conversation surrounding 
risk, uncertainty or their synonyms. Again, the term |𝑏 − 𝑝| < 10  holds the condition that the 
conversation is considered as an environmental risk if an environmental political bigram appears 
within ten words surrounding the synonyms of risk. Invariant from equation one, the measurement is 
double-weighted by the relevance to political issues (
𝑓𝑏,ℙ
𝐵ℙ




) . The last term in the numerator: log (
𝑍
𝑓𝑏,ℤ
) is the diagram b’s inverse 
frequency, measures the relevance of each bigram to the topic (environmental or others). For 
example, diagrams such as carbon emission are more relevant to the environmental topic than to 
other issues. Finally, the 𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 is a weighted measurement adjust for the relevance 
of diagrams to political environmental topics.  
(2)            
𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 =  














According to the measurement processes, a higher value of PRisk_environment implies firms facing 
higher risk of earnings being negatively affected by possible environmental policy changes. 
To validate that the above measurement truly captures the environmental risks, the top five bigrams 
appeared in this category are demonstrated to be closely related to the environmental topic. The top 
ten bigrams appeared in the environment-related conversation include “air act”, “from renewable”, 
“climate change”, “clean air”, “states’ rights”, “greenhouse gas”, “nuclear power”, “nations energy”, 
“foreign oil”, “with OPEC” and “global warming”. Furthermore, based on past literature that 




dampen the growth (Pindyck,1988; Konar, 2001; Clarkson, 2011). On Hassan et al (2019), the 
measurement is proved for its validity by showing that stock volatility is significantly correlated 
with political risk measurement results after controlled for time and industry effects. 
Distinct from previous literature that often employ environmental disclosure score as the proxy of 
firms’ environmental performance, the environment risk measurement developed from textual 
analysis of earning announcement conference calls has two strengths.  
First, as mentioned previously, the Hassan et al (2019) risk measurement can help avoid sample bias. 
The methodologies adopted by major ESG score provider varies in terms of perspectives and 
interpretation can be largely dependent on the context. Past studies find that environmental scores 
from different providers often feature some common dimensions. Consequently, the aggregate data 
distributions are found to be heterogeneous. Correlation between environmental scores from 
different providers is the lowest among the three ESG dimensions (Semenova and Hassel, 2014; 
Dorfleitner et al,2015; Chatterji et al, 2015)  
Dorfleitner et al (2015) suggest that the statistical difference in datasets can ultimately produce 
biased analytical results. The measurement employed in this paper is purely based on textual 
analysis of companies’ internal speech, and the trained library for filtering information contains only 
the archetypical discussion of environmental matters. We believe this approach should largely avoid 
subjective or deliberate selection of particular aspects in environmental topics, hence increase the 
credibility of further analytical results. 
Second, the subject of computational linguistic analysis—earnings announcement conference calls 
provide higher predictability. Several conventional models suggest that environmental misconduct 
can significantly affect firms’ financial performance (Konar, 2001; Clarkson, 2011). With the 
growing popularity of ESG Investment, investment decisions made by investors such as indices and 
mutual funds are contingent upon the accuracy and predictability of ESG ratings. However, the 




typically document firms’ past environmental results. Hence the question becomes can ESG ratings 
reliably forecast which company will have superior environmental performance in the future. 
Chatterji et al. (2009) finds that although the environmental concerns produced by the KLD database 
constitute a reasonably good measure for the past environmental performance, the ratings are not 
able to predict future environmental developments. In contrast, the Hassan et al (2019) measurement 
can potentially provide higher predictability since risk-related information is gathered from firms’ 
internal conference calls, where top managers disclose environmental risks assessment based on 
current firm performance and environment policies.  
 
 
3.3 Control variables 
Although the hypothesis to be tested in this paper is related to board gender equality, several other 
firm characteristics can affect environmental risks as well. Based on previous literature that 
investigates the relationship between firm characteristics and environmental performance, we 
include the following control variables: Return on Assets (ROA); Market value of equity 
(MKTVAL); Tobin’s Q; Book Leverage (BookLeverage) and number of total employees (EMPL). 
First, Russo and Fouts (1997) state that in light of resource-based view of firms, voluntarily 
implementing stricter environmental policy pushes firms to develop internal competencies such as 
production innovation or firm reputation, hence reflect the improvement on financial performance, 
which is proxied by ROA. Second, the firm size, which measured by firm’s market value of equity, 
is included. Stakeholders can pressure companies to adopt proactive policies because superior 
environmental policy can potentially improve financial performance. Profound research results 
suggest that bigger firms and smaller firms are facing different stakeholder pressure (Delmas, 2001; 
Lepoutre and Heene, 2006; Noci and Verganti, 1999), hence are likely to have different behavior in 
terms of environmental initiatives. Third, Gao & Connors (2011) suggest that capital structure can 
be related to environmental performance, such as toxic emission. Hence the book leverage is 




contained to control for the impact the market reaction on environmental performance. Fifth, similar 
to control for market size, the number of total employees is also included in the function to control 
for any size effect. Finally, the analysis has also controlled for industry effects. The control variables 
are retrieved from the COMPUSTAT database for U. S. listed firm from 2002 to 2019. Because the 
dataset was retrieved on Jan 2020, data on fiscal year 2019 is relatively limited. However, in order to 
maximize the sample size, the 2019 data is also included in the sample. Variables other than Tobin’s 
Q and Book Leverage are directly provided by the COMPUSTAT. The computation of the Book 
Leverage follows Huang and Kisgen (2013). It equals to long-term debt plus debt in current 
liabilities over long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities plus the book value of common equity 
plus preferred stock liquidating value minus deferred taxes and investment tax credits. Tobin’s Q 
follows conventional function that stock market capitalization plus book value of liabilities as a ratio 
of total assets.  Before the calculation, rows with any missed values are deleted from the sample, 
only complete cases remain. After the computation, the firm performance dataset is merged with the 
female board dataset and environment risk dataset by the joint variable GVKEY_fyear. The final 
sample for further analysis contains 27,925 firm-year records. Table 1 represents lists of relevant 
variables and their descriptive statistics. The variable Femaleboard% refers to ratio of female board 
to board size. The variable Following Hassan et al (2019) ’s approach, the variable standardized 
Environment Risk refers to environmental risk standardized with mean of zero and standard 
deviation of one.  
 On the other hand, the average female board representation from 2002 to 2019 was only 3.8%, 75% 
percentile was 0 percent, confirm that majority of firms have all-male boards. The number of female 
boards, however, as a result of quota laws, ESG investment, and greater gender equality, has grown 
almost every country around the world year by year. The dataset also confirms this tendency in 
Table 2. It is observable that from 2002 to 2018, the average female board percentage increased 
from 2.3% to 5% in a stable speed. The 2019 data were not reported due to the lack of observation 
when retrieving the data. On the other hand, other variables such as employment size, Tobin’s Q, 




This table reports descriptive statistics for relevant variables. The sample contains an unbalanced panel data, 
collected from firms listed in U.S. stock exchanges from 2002 to 2019. It contains in total 27,925 firm-year records. 
Femaleboard% is calculated as percentage of female board to board size. ROA is return on assets. MKTVAL is 
market value of equity. Follows Huang and Kisgen (2013), BookLeverage is calculated as long-term debt plus debt in 
current liabilities over long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities plus the book value of common equity plus 
preferred stock liquidating value minus deferred taxes and investment tax credits. Tobin’s Q follows conventional 

















Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Pctl(1) Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Pctl(99)  Median 
 
  
Femaleboard% 27,927 3.8 9.6 0 0 0 40  0 
GEI 26,865 43.9 8.0 27.6 38.4 51.6 56.1  45.8 
ROA 27,716 3.1 16.2 -46.5 1.0 7.9 26.60  4.0 
MKTVAL 27,721 9,773.8 32,203.1 43.4 728.2 6,208.3 153328.2  1975.8 
BookLeverage 25,782 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.05 0.3 0.88  0.2 
EMPL 27,749 19.7 67.5 0.03 1.4 14.7 252.8  4.7 
TobinsQ 27,657 1.9 1.3 0.7 1.1 2.1 7.3  1.5 
Standardized Environment 
Risk 











Femaleboard ROA mktval BookLeverage EMPL TobinsQ 
1 2002 -0.1 2.3 0 6378.2 0.2 20.9 1.7 
2 2003 0 2.6 2.7 7360.5 0.2 19.2 2 
3 2004 -0.1 2.7 3.9 8166.6 0.2 19.6 2 
4 2005 -0.1 2.7 4.1 8783 0.2 21 2 
5 2006 0 3 5.3 9148.5 0.2 19.9 2 
6 2007 0 3.4 3.9 8231.9 0.2 17.8 2 





This table reports descriptive statistics for relevant variables on their yearly changes. The sample contains an 
unbalanced panel data, collected from firms listed in U.S. stock exchanges from 2002 to 2019. It contains in total 
27,925 firm-year records. Femaleboard% is calculated as percentage of female board to board size. ROA is return on 
assets. MKTVAL is market value of equity. Follows Huang and Kisgen (2013), BookLeverage is calculated as long-
term debt plus debt in current liabilities over long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities plus the book value of 
common equity plus preferred stock liquidating value minus deferred taxes and investment tax credits. Tobin’s Q 
follows conventional function that stock market capitalization plus book value of liabilities as a ratio of total assets. 
 
3.4 Empirical Design 
Endogeneity is always a concern when testing statistical relationships in the topics of corporate 
finance. Wooldridge (2009) defines endogeneity as a dependent variable can be correlated to error 
term instead of independent variable, either due to omitted variable or simultaneity. In the context of 
this paper, it is equivalent to the possibility that it is not the female board representation reducing 
environmental risk, but it is the firm that is proactively controlling environmental risks also tends to 
be progressive on hiring female boards. To address the lingering concerns on reverse causality issue, 
this paper will conduct the two-stages-least squares regression (2SLS).  
To efficiently control for endogeneity, the choice of instrument variable becomes crucial. In order to 
ensure the instrument is valid, it must be sufficiently strongly correlated to endogenous variable, i.e., 
female board percentage. At the same time, the instrument should be independent from the 
dependent variable, i.e., environmental risk. Following Huang and Kisgen (2013), the instrument 
variable used in this study is based on a previous study which assesses the state-level gender equality 
level (Sugarman and Staus, 1998). The paper offers a Gender Equality Index that measures gender 
equality from economic, political, and legal perspectives. It is natural to assume that firms with their 
8 2009 0.1 3.9 1.7 6454 0.2 17.2 1.7 
9 2010 0.1 3.9 4.5 7591.8 0.2 17.8 1.8 
10 2011 0 3.9 4.2 7661.6 0.2 18.6 1.7 
11 2012 0.1 4 3.6 8742 0.2 19.2 1.8 
12 2013 0 4.2 4 11210.8 0.2 19.8 2.1 
13 2014 -0.1 4.3 3.8 12127 0.2 19.7 2.1 
14 2015 -0.1 4.5 1.7 12063.4 0.2 20.7 1.9 
15 2016 0 4.7 3 13690.4 0.2 21.5 2 
16 2017 0.1 5.1 3.4 16178.8 0.2 22.1 2.1 




headquarters in more equality-advanced states tend to have a higher percentage of female board 
members. Empirically, Grosvold, J. & Brammer, S. (2011) emphasize the importance of institutional 
systems in driving corporate board diversity, especially the cultural and legal-related institutional 
systems that have a highly significant impact on board diversity. Hence, we argue that the GEI 
should be an adequate instrument for predicting female board representation. Furthermore, employ 
GEI as instrument variable also fulfills the requirement that it should not be correlated to 
environmental risk. Finally, based on the results of Sugarman and Staus (1998), state GEIs are 
assigned to each firm-year record based on thier corresponding head office locations.  
The following 2SLS model will be implemented: 
(3) First Stage  
𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑%𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐸𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
(4) Second Stage 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑%̂ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑤𝑖𝑡 + ℇ𝑖𝑡 
Where 𝑤𝑖 contains a set of control variables include ROA, Tobin’s Q, Book Leverage, log(Market 
Value), employee number. 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑%̂ 𝑖  is the predicted value based on the first stage 
regression results. Table 3 reports the coefficients on the first stage and second stage results with 
standard deviation stated in brackets.  
 
 




This table reports the 2SLS regression results from Equation 3 and 4. Column one reports the first 
stage result where gender equality index as dependent variable, female board percentage and a set of 
control variables as independent variables. Column two reports the second stage results where 
standardized environmental risk as dependent variable, instrumented female board percentage and a 
set of control variables as independent variables. Both stages incorporate year fixed effect and 
industry effects. Significance levels of 10% , 5%, or 1% are indicated as *,**,*** respectively. 
 
3.5 Results and Discussion 
 
As predicted, the state-level Gender Equality Index positively correlated to female board percentage 
at 1% significance. To be precise, from a range of zero to one hundred, if GEI increase by one 
standard deviation, the frequency of female sitting in the board increase by 8.42%. Again, consistent 
 
 
      Dependent variable: 
 









































TobinsQ 0.073 -0.002 
 
(0.054) (0.007) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 21,170 21,170 
Residual Std. Error 
 








with the hypothesis, the coefficient on the second stage indicates that the predicted female board 
percentage is negatively correlated with environmental risk, and it is statistically significant at 5% 
level. The coefficient also reveals that when the female board percentage increase by one standard 
deviation, the environmental uncertainty faced by firms decrease by 1.5%. This result is computed 
based on the coefficient of original environmental risk and its mean. 
 
Recall that the average percentage of female members on the management board is around 3.8%, so 
boards are highly skewed to males, at least among the sample analyzed in this paper. Frequently, the 
question of whether the female board is only a token, has been investigated in prior literature. 
Previous research shows that gender diversity in the boardroom tends to have marginal effect unless 
the board has a critical mass of at least three women (Post et al., 2011; Liao et al., 2015). The results 
of the 2SLS test in this study, however, suggest that the limited number of female participants in the 
board still play an important role on mitigating environmental risk, regardless of the critical mass of 
three females.  
 
On the other hand, reminding that the environmental risk utilized in this paper is based on 
computational linguistic interpretation of listed firms’ earnings announcement conference call. The 
measurement itself is essentially gauging the level of potential environmental uncertainties caused 
by political changes. Those changes can either caused by stricter government regulations on 
pollution emission or climate treaties signed with other countries etc. Although one could argue that 
environmental policy changes may not necessarily become stricter hence force firms to cope with 
greener production processes, the Environmental Policy Stringency (EPS) indicator, developed by 
the OECD demonstrates that there is a general increase in the stringency in majority countries over 
the past 20 years (OECD, 2016). Consequently, environment-political risks become threatening 
financial outcomes by imposing new cost elements on firms, at least in the short run (Kalamova and 
Johnstone,2011). However, this kind of risk, according to the above empirical result, can be 




through female boards’ risk aversion and benevolence, as well as diversity theory. In the context of 
fast-changing and more stringent environmental policy changes, corporates that hold their 
environmental standards just above the bottom lines are heavily exposed to the risk of future 
political changes. Hence the existence of more risk-averse decision-makers may lead the company to 
voluntarily tighten up corporate regulations to rule out the future uncertainties. Moreover, the 
presence of the female board helps mitigate environmental risks by bringing in different ethical 
values. Adams and Funk (2012) indicates that the female board tends to demonstrate higher 
universalism and superior concerns over stakeholders’ value. Thus, they are more likely to formulate 
more eco-friendly corporate strategies. Finally, we argue that the existence of the female board 
contributes to less environmental risk through a better decision-making process. Diversity theory 
suggests that different backgrounds and expertise among decision-makers can enhance the decision-
making outcomes. Hence, it is reasonable to argue that female boards bring in different perspectives 
(particularly concerns for third party stakeholders) into the decision-making process to minimize 
environmental risk. Also, existing trust relationships between directors can be disrupted by 
increasing female board representation (Cummings et al., 2015), hence result in reducing the level of 




Section 4: Robustness Check and Additional Test 
 
4.1 Robustness Check 
 
Based on the 2SLS model, two internal validity tests are performed to ensure the credibility of the 
result. First, to test whether the 2SLS approach is adequate, the Hausman-Wu test is conducted. In 
the 2SLS setting, the female board percentage is suspected to be endogenous to environmental risk. 
It is crucial to make sure that we do have an endogeneity problem to address, because 2SLS has a 




two variables are irrelevant, the p-value gives 0.0184, rejected the null hypothesis. Therefore, the 
endogeneity issue does exist, and 2SLS is an appropriate approach to address it. 
 
Second, concerning the relevance between the instrument and the endogenous variable is strong 
enough or not, the Weak IV hypothesis is tested. The F-statistic from the first-stage results is 13.935. 
Based on the rule of thumb threshold of 10 (Stock and Yogo,2002), weak instrument concerns were 
eliminated. 
 
Third, similar 2SLS regression is implemented to further emphasize the risk-reducing impact of 
female board representation. We examine the relationship between female board percentage and 
overall political risks, find similar results to the previous 2SLS test. Although compare to 
environmental risk, the extent of the female board reducing overall political risk is slightly lower, 
however, still significant at a 5% level. Again, the weak instrument concern is rejected by the F-
statistics, and the result of the Hausman-Wu test (p-value of 0.0324) also suggests that 2SLS should 
be employed in this case. 














































This table reports the additional 2SLS regression results. Column one reports the first stage result where gender 
equality index as dependent variable, female board percentage and a set of control variables as independent variables. 
Column two reports the second stage results where standardized political risk as dependent variable, instrumented 
female board percentage and a set of control variables as independent variables. Both stages incorporate year fixed 




4.2 Additional Test on Maternity Leave 
 
The main 2SLS provides additional insights into the existing literature by investigating the linkage 
between gender diversity and financial outcomes. Specifically, the result indicates that a higher ratio 
of female board mitigates the level of environmental risk exposure. At the same time, this result 
holds despite the critical mass theory. i.e., there is no threshold for female board representation to 
make a significant impact. 
 
The positive relationship suggested by this paper, as well as other prior studies, creates an economic 
motivation for firms recruit more female talents. Together with the legal pressure created by gender 
quota legislation, ethical and financial pressure created by society and ESG investors, modern firms 
are currently on a high demand for female managerial talents. Thus, the next question becomes what 















   TobinsQ 0.073 -1.007 
 
(0.054) (0.942) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
   
 
Observations 21,170 21,170 
Residual Std. Error 
 
142.872 (df = 21052) 
F Statistic 13.935
***






It is frequently argued that the inequality in labor opportunities and outcomes can occur because of 
the new mothers' recovery period. Social protection schemes, such as the provision of paid maternity 
leave and benefits help to mitigate the inequality. Previous studies have put emphasis on examining 
impact of maternity leave policy on general female labor market, find maternity leave policy 
increases overall female participation rate, decreases discontinuity of previous career, no significant 
impact on short-term wages , however, once the time-length of maternity leave is extended to above 
one year, it potentially harms participation rate, career advancement and wages (Ruhm,1998; 
Lequien, 2012 ; Das and Polachek 2015, Rossin-Slater et al. 2013, Kluve and Tamm, 2013; Baum 
and Ruhm 2016). However, the characterization of how the policy affects the managerial female 
labor market is still missing in the literature. Considering different responsibilities and functionality 
of managerial roles, it might be ambiguous to generalize the impact of maternity leave policy on the 
general labor market to the managerial labor market.  
 
In curiosity of whether paid maternity leave affect managerial female labor market outcome, this 
question is tested and clarified by a difference-in-difference approach using U.S data. By far, five 
states have been enacting the paid leave program. Those include California since 2004, New Jersey 
since 2008, Rhode Island since 2014, New York since 2018, and Washington state since 2019. 
Variations have been evidenced across states, include duration and job protection. The duration 
varies from 4 weeks provided in Rhode Island to 12 weeks in New York.  
 
The summary of paid maternity leave policies implemented by each state is shown in the Table 4. It 
provides information on the start date for each state to implement paid maternity leave policy and 
the time length of leave in weeks. Although we posit that the paid maternity leave policy as a shock 
will increase the presentation of female board and CEO, it is worth noting that particular attention 
should be paid to disentangle the effect of other unobservable effects (e.g., higher female board ratio 
maybe caused by constant improvement of gender equality) from the impact of policy shock. 




group mean difference when a treatment group and a control group exist while avoiding endogeneity. 
Hence, it is especially suitable for studying exogenous maternity leave policy shocks. Specifically, 




𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑%𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡+𝛽3(𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
(6) 
𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡+𝛽3(𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 
Again, similar to the previous test, the dependent variable: female board representation is measured 
as an equally weighted proportion of female directors sitting on the board. An additional dependent 
variable: female CEO representation, is created as a dummy variable, which is equal to one if the 
CEO gender is female on a specific firm-year record and zero otherwise. The above data is retrieved 
from Execucomp. 
 
Table 5 Summary on Paid Maternity Leave Policy Time Length (Weeks) 
  
California New.Jersey Rhode.Island New.York Washington.state Washington.D.C 
2004 6      
2005 6      
2006 6      
2007 6      
2008 6      
2009 6 6     
2010 6 6     
2011 6 6     
2012 6 6     
2013 6 6     
2014 6 6 4    
2015 6 6 4    
2016 6 6 4    
2017 6 6 4    




2019 6 6 4 10 12  
2020 8 12 4 10 12 8 
2021 8 12 4 12 12 8 
This table represents current paid maternity leave time length entitled to successful applicants in different states. Left 







Due to the data constraint, the first three issuance of maternity policy on California, New Jersey and 
Rhode Island will be employed as policy shocks in our difference-in-difference model. In the context 
of this paper, states that enacted paid maternity leave will be separated into three different treated 
groups by the timing of their implementations: California firms in 2004; California and New Jersey 
firms in 2009; California, New Jersey and Rhode Island firms in 2014. Hence, the binary treatment 
variable 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is equal to one if the companies headquarter is located in the treated states and 
equal to zero otherwise. Similarly, the window of our investigation is 3 years before and after the 
implementation year, hence the total window will be 7 years. The dummy variable 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡   is 
created to capture the time series difference. Typically, 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡  equals to one when the firm-year 
record is after the implementation, for example, 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 1 for CA groups when the date is after 
2004. 
For control groups, to control the structural difference of firm characteristics and their effects on the 
female board representation, instead of simply counting the remaining firm-year records, the control 
groups are constructed using the propensity matching approach (Rosenbaum and Rubin,1983). The 
details of construction are as the following.  
 
First, each group (CA, CANJ and CANJRI) are subsets from the total sample based on 




years. Among the complete cases sample, treated firms on the enactment year are matched to control 
firms in the same year, for instance, California firms in 2004 are matched to non-California firms in 
2004. The propensity score measures the probability of treatment assignment based on a set of 
variables X. 
 
(7) 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = Pr (𝐷 = 1|𝑋) = 𝜙(𝛽0̂ + 𝛽1̂𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2̂𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑄𝑖 + 𝛽3̂𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 +
𝛽4̂𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑣𝑎𝑙)) 
 
Where D is participation status, 𝜙 is a standard normal distribution cumulative function, matching 
variables include Book Leverage, Tobin’s Q, Return on Asset and log(market value), which 
computation of Book Leverage and Tobin’ Q are defined on section 2.2. The matching process is 
conducted without replacement and caliper of 0.025. Finally, the sample ready for DID analysis are 
formed by 7-year records of matched firms. As a result, CA group consists of 308 unique firms and 
2156 firm-year records, CANJ group consists of 378 unique firms and 2646 firm-year records, 
CANJRI group consists of 338 unique firms and 2366 firm-year records in total.   
 
The validity of matching is tested based on the unconfoundedness condition (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin,1983). Table 5 reports that differences between the control and treatment group variables are 
statistically insignificant, giving credibility to the matching results. In the meantime, the parallel 
trend tests are performed to ensure the results yield from propensity matching fulfills the most 
primary assumption of DD estimator. The parallel trend assumption refers to the condition that the 
average change of the dependent variable (Female board % and Female CEO in this paper) in 
control groups and treatment groups should be statistically indifferent. Equivalently, this condition 
implies that before the implementation of paid maternity leave policy, change on female board or 
CEO representation should be indifferent in every state. Table 6 reports that there is no evidence of 
significant difference in average change before the implementation of a paid maternity leave policy. 




Results from three separate tests are consistent in the manner that there is weak evidence suggests 




This table reports the quality of propensity matching. Panel A reports quality of CA group matching quality, panel B 
reports CANJ group matching quality, panel C reports CANJRI group matching quality. Each group contains 308, 
378 and 338 matched pairs respectively. ROA is return on assets. MKTVAL is market value of equity. Follows 
Huang and Kisgen (2013), BookLeverage is calculated as long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities over long-
term debt plus debt in current liabilities plus the book value of common equity plus preferred stock liquidating value 
minus deferred taxes and investment tax credits. Tobin’s Q follows conventional function that stock market 
capitalization plus book value of liabilities as a ratio of total assets. 
Table 6 Propensity Matching Quality 
 





(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 

















































ROA 0.95 2.01 0.083 0.420 
 (14.52) (10.92)   
TobinsQ 1.68 1.79 0.141 0.172 
 (0.74) (0.90)   
MKTVAL 7165.40 10529.61 0.120 0.246 
 (27542.86) (28446.78)   
BookLeverage 0.14 0.15 0.017 0.313 
 (0.18) (0.18)   
 
Panel C: CANJRI group (n=338) 
  
  
     
ROA 6.37 5.96 0.054 0.621 
 (8.10) (7.11)   
TobinsQ 2.44 2.28 0.104 0.339 
 (1.88) (1.28)   
MKTVAL 14286.59 21756.51 0.085 0.438 
 (36632.91) ( 61745.68)   
BookLeverage 0.16 0.15 0.147 0.178 
 (0.19) (0.16)   
     





This table reports pre-treatment period (three-year period before implementation of the policy) the mean change in 
Femaleboard% and FemaleCEO for the treatment groups and control groups respectively. Treatment groups are 
defined as a set of firm-year records which firm headquarters are located in states which implement paid maternity 
policy on the exact year of implementation. The remaining firm-year records on the corresponding year are defined as 
control groups. 
This table reports impacts of implementation of paid maternity leave policy on female board and female CEO 
representation using the difference-in-difference method with propensity matching approach. Treatment groups are 
defined as a set of firm-year records which firm headquarters are located in states which implement paid maternity 
Table 7 Test of Parallel Trend Assumption 
  
   Panel A: CA Group                Panel B: CANJ Group                    Panel C: CANJRI Group 
  
 
ΔFemaleboard% ΔFemaleCEO ΔFemaleboard ΔFemaleCEO ΔFemaleboard% ΔFemaleCEO 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Control 0.39 0.00 -0.27 0.00 -0.27 0.00 
 
(5.67) (0.00) (5.15) (0.00) (5.25) (0.00) 
       
Treat 0.01 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.21 0.01 
 
(4.35) (0.09) (5.24) (0.00) (5.24) (0.08) 
       
Test SMD 0.076 <0.001 0.091 <0.001 0.091 0.111 
 p-value 0.151 1.00 0.437 1.00 0.437 0.429 
       
 
Table 8 Maternity Leave Difference in Difference Test 
   Panel A: CA Group                Panel B: CANJ Group          Panel C: CANJRI Group 
 
Femaleboard% FemaleCEO Femaleboard% FemaleCEO Femaleboard% FemaleCEO 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Post -0.077 -0.001 0.575 0.010 0.472 0.0005 
 









(0.453) (0.005) (0.539) (0.007) (0.594) (0.009) 
Post*Treat 0.591 -0.008 -0.388 -0.010 0.320 0.015 
 
(0.599) (0.006) (0.713) (0.009) (0.786) (0.012) 
       





policy on the exact year of implementation. The remaining firm-year records on the corresponding year are defined as 
control groups. 
 
Section 5: Discussion and Conclusion 
 
In light of gender socialization theory, diversity theory, and the behavioral difference between 
genders, the hypothesis that female board members have a significant impact on firm environmental 
risk level has been tested in this paper. In order to mitigate the issue of endogeneity, the IV analysis 
has been employed to test the hypothesis. On the other hand, distinct from previous papers, the 
environmental risk variable is retrieved from Hassan et al (2019), who measures environmental risks 
as the ratio that earnings announcement speakers devote to risks triggered by possible future changes 
in environmental policy. This measurement is arguably more credible than the environmental 
disclosure score provided by major vendors such as Bloomberg. Because the E scores are susceptible 
to different valuation criteria and have significant heterogeneity in statistical distribution (Dorfleitner 
et al., 2015). Most importantly, environmental scores produced by vendors are not able to predict 
future environmental developments (Chatterji et al., 2009). In contrast, Hassan et al (2019) dataset 
provides better credibility by directly retrieve information from the speech of firms' decision-makers.  
 
As a result, there is a statistically significant relationship between female board representation and 
firm-level environmental risk-taking behavior. Specifically, one standard deviation increases on 
female board percentage can reduce environmental risk by 1.5%.  Several theories and past 
empirical results can justify these results. They include gender socialization theory, diversity theory, 
and behavioral difference between genders. The gender socialization theory suggests that women 
and men have different ethical views due to early experiences through social interactions. 
Specifically, women tend to have higher ethical sensitivity than men. Hence female boards are more 
motivated to mitigate environmental risk, which may hurt the value of whole society. Furthermore, 
Diversity theory suggests that decision-makers with different backgrounds and perspectives can 




on balancing firm performance and environmental risks, hence increasing the possibility that the 
board finds optimal environmental policies. Finally, drawing on past behavioral economic studies, 
females are found to be consistently more risk-averse and less overconfident than males in 
investment settings and professional settings (Byrnes et al., 1999; Olsen and Cox, 2001; Gibson et 
al., 2013). Both features justify the result that firms with more female boards tend to preempt 
environmental risk.  
 
 The result is robust after testing the 2SLS model's internal validity and additional tests on overall 
political risks. As an additional test, determinants of female representation are analyzed in a 
quantitative way. When examining whether paid maternity leave policy is an important determinant, 
the result of DID analysis find weak evidence suggests that paid maternity leave significantly impact 
on female board representation. 
 
This paper contributes to existing literature, mainly in two ways. Firstly, to our knowledge, this 
paper is one of the first studies to link female board representation to environment risk-taking 
behavior. Prior studies have focused on finding the impact on either the financial performance or 
overall ESG ratings (Erhardt, Werbel & Shrader,2003; Carter et al. ,2003; Erhardt et al.,2003; 
Gordini & Rancati, 2017; Velte, 2016). However, this study specifies the target of environmental 
risk-taking behavior and find that a negative relationship does exist. Secondly, given the background 
that investors, corporate decision-makers, and policymakers are raising awareness of firms' 
environmental conduct, this paper provides evidence that female board representation can be a 
strong signal of firms' superior environmental policies. 
 
A caveat of our findings is that the reduction of environmental risk may not have an immediate 
impact  on firms' financial outcomes as one may posits. Previous studies argue that the relationship 
between environmental and financial performance is non-linear, suggest that firms start to benefit 




(Elsayed,2004). The heterogeneity of benefit have been evidenced on several aspects, for example, it 
depends on the industry, areas of initiatives, market conditions or even macroeconomic conditions 
(Misani and Pogutz, 2015; Iwata and Okada, 2011; Qi et al., 2014; Lucas and Noordewier, 2016; 
Feng et al., 2016). Therefore, those firm characteristics that may cause non-linearity should be taken 
into account when investigating the role of female boards in the relationship between environmental 
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